CIC Backgrounder on Israel’s New Government
Posted on: April 2, 2009

Previous Likud prime ministers have been vilified at the beginning of their terms as “right wing” and “intransigent,” only to prove otherwise. As Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s coalition government takes office, it is incumbent on Canadians to judge Israel’s new government as it would any other: based on policy and actions, and not premature conjecture, or hype.

Israel’s Political Climate

The Israeli electorate is increasingly skeptical and frustrated regarding the possibility of securing a long term, comprehensive peace agreement, with many concluding that the Palestinians are not currently positioned to make an historic compromise with Israel:

  • The 1998 Wye agreement and the Quartet’s 2002 “Performance Based Road Map” conditioned further progress in the peace process on Palestinian Authority (PA) security reforms, which have failed to materialize.
  • Instead of bringing peace and security, Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from southern Lebanon (2000) and Gaza (2005) led to aggression and attacks from these areas.
  • The Annapolis “shelf” agreement on final status issues failed to bear fruit, despite the Olmert government’s unprecedented willingness to negotiate Palestinian demands.

The historical record demonstrates that Israeli leaders coming from the right wing of the political spectrum have proven especially capable at negotiating compromise:

  • Menachem Begin uprooted Jewish settlements and relinquished the vast Sinai Peninsula for peace with Egypt in 1979.
  • Yitzhak Shamir participated in the 1991 Madrid Conference, which launched the Middle East Peace Process.
  • Ariel Sharon withdrew completely from Gaza in 2005, forcibly displacing thousands of Israeli civilians from their homes.
  • Ehud Olmert embarked on the Annapolis process and laid out a far-reaching proposal including Israeli withdrawal from most of the West Bank and eastern Jerusalem.

Benjamin Netanyahu

Despite concerns related to his opposition to the Annapolis process (which was never formally approved by the Knesset and cabinet, and is therefore not “binding” on the new government) Benjamin Netanyahu’s record demonstrates his experience advancing significant diplomatic processes with Israel’s neighbours and a willingness to take calculated risks for peace:

  • Netanyahu successfully negotiated the January 1997 Hebron Agreement which placed 80 per cent of the city under Palestinian control.
  • Netanyahu successfully negotiated the October 1998 Wye River Memorandum, an agreement involving Israeli territorial concessions designed to break a deadlock in the peace process and refocus on long-term issues for permanent settlement.
  • Netanyahu conducted secret negotiations on a peace agreement with Syria, in which (according to many accounts) he was willing to cede much – if not all – of the Golan Heights.

Netanyahu has signalled his intention to seek forward movement in the peace process, recalibrating the diplomatic track to a more realistic reflection of the current situation:

  • Netanyahu proposes fast impact projects that would improve the economy for Palestinians in the West Bank, proceeding in parallel with political negotiations – what he calls “economic peace.”
  • Netanyahu will seek to focus on “realistic medium-term issues” in his talks with the Palestinians, such as improving quality of life and building PA institutions to facilitate the achievement of security obligations under the “Performance Based Road Map”.
  • Netanyahu has said that “a combination of political talk and rapid economic development is the best way to create a new reality in the PA.” Concrete change on the ground “is worth one thousand peace conferences.”

Avigdor Lieberman

Lieberman ran a bombastic and controversial election campaign as the head of “Yisrael Beiteinu” (Israel Our Home), that featured, in the view of many, extremist policy rhetoric:

  • Lieberman openly spearheaded an initiative to ban the major Arab political parties.
  • Yisrael Beiteinu called for citizenship rights to be contingent on a “loyalty oath” for those who do not serve in the Israel Defence Forces.
  • Lieberman also calls for a land re-allocation with the Palestinians based on demographic composition, i.e. Arab populated areas of Israel being transferred to the PA in exchange for Israeli settlement blocs in the West bank.

However, on closer examination, Lieberman’s platform was comprised of more than just a focus on Israel’s Arab citizens:

  • Lieberman endorses the formation of an independent Palestinian state, and has expressed support for the division of Jerusalem in a final two-state peace deal.
  • Lieberman was the only Israeli politician to openly champion the introduction of civil union for Israelis as an alternative to religious matrimony and called for reforms in the conversion process to Judaism.

As expected, the coalition building process has compelled Lieberman to tone down his rhetoric and take a more pragmatic approach. It is highly unlikely that government policy will reflect Lieberman’s roughest edges:

  • Yisrael Beiteinu dropped their “loyalty oath” proposal in negotiations to join the Netanyahu coalition government, and it will not become government policy.
  • Lieberman was most adamant in coalition negotiations about reforms regarding domestic identity and rights issues such as civil union and conversion.
  • The inclusion of the Labour Party in the coalition will further moderate the government agenda, particularly vis-à-vis the Palestinians, as Labour’s participation is conditional on respect for the peace process.
  • Lieberman’s political record shows him to be a remarkably more cooperative actor when in government than when campaigning from the opposition.